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[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of AllowanceMeet of Agreement of Parties.-When an order for support
payments in a divorce decree is based on an agreement of the
parties; the possibility of subsequent modification of the order
without the consent of both parties depends on the nature
of the agreement.
[I] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-E1feet
of Agreement of Parties.-Where husband and wife agree to a
simple division of their property or agree that one party is
to receive the lion's share of the marital property and the
other mouey payments, not in satisfaction of a statutory right
to support but solely to equalize the division of the marital
property, the agreement is a true property settlement unconoerned with rights and duties as to support j the court may
approve such agreement and in addition order the payment of
alimony, and such order is subject to modification on an adequate showing of changed circumstances. (Civ. Code, § 139.)
[8] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effeet
of Agreement of Partles.-Where husband and wife agree that
the wife will receive specified money payments in lieu of the
statutory right to support, such an agreement is a true "alimony" or "support and maintenance" agreement, and a support order based thereon is modifiable on an adequate showing
of changed circumstances.
[4a-4c] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Modifieation of Allowanee-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-Where husband and wife enter
into a hybrid agreement to settle not only property rights but
rights and duties as to support, the possibility of modifying
an order for support based on such an agreement without the
consent of the parties depends on whether the provisions for
division of property and the provisions for support are severable rather than integrated; if they are integrated the order
may not be modified unless the parties have provided for or
agreed to such a modification.
[5] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties:
Modification of Allowanee.-An agreement between husband
and wife is integrated if the parties .have agreed that the
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d. Divorce and Separation, § 217.
McE.. Dig. Ref~nees: [1-4, 9, 10J Divorce, § 216(1)
vorce, §§ 203, 216(1); [6-8] Divorce, § 203.

j
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[6]

[7]

)
[8]

[9]

provisions relating to division of property and those relating
to support constitute reciprocal consideration, sinee the 811pport provisions are then necessarily part and parcel of a
division of property; such an agreement would be destroyed
by subsequent modification of a support order based thereon
without the consent of the parties, and it is immaterial whether
or not the marital property is divided equally, that the amount
of the marital property is small, or that the agreement calls
for payments for "support" or "alimony."
Id.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.An agreement between husband and wife providing that their
purpose is to reach a final settlement of their rights and duties
with respect to both property and support, that they intend
each provision to be in consideration for each of the other
provisions, and that they waive all rights arising out of the
marital relationship except those expressly set out in the
agreement, will be deemed conclusive evidence that they intended an integrated agreement.
Id.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.Where husband and wife may be uncertain as to the value or
legal ownership of property, or uncertain which of them is
entitled to a divorce and on what grounds and therefore
uncertain as to their legal rights with respect to support and
the division of property, an agreement for a specified division
of property and specified support payments settling sueh uneertainties is integrated in the absence of convincing proof
that they intended it to be severable.
Id.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.Where an agreement between husband and wife deals both
with rights to marital property and rights to support, and
they have set forth their purpose "to effect a final and complete settlement of their . . . rights . . . with reference to
their marital status and to each other" and have released eacb
other from all claims arising out of tbe marital relationship
except as provided in the agreement, the inference is clear
that the parties intended an integrated agreement j it is not
necessary that they expressly recite such an intent when the
agreement itself makes the~intent clear.
Id.-Permanent Alimony-Modi1ication of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.-A provision in an agreement between husband and wife that "For purposes of this agreement
no earnings of Wife or other income obtained by her shall
be considered as a 'changed condition' and taken into consideration in connection with any attempt of Husband to obtain
a reduction in payment for support of Wife or said child, ...
except such portion of said earnings or other income as shall
exceed the gros~ 'average monthly sum of Two Hundred Fifty
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Dollare," indicatea that the parties contemplated modification.
on an adequate showing of changed oircumatancea with ai
single limitation, that so long as the wife'a earnings or other'
income did not exceed the monthly average of $250 any
inereuse in her income would not be conaidered a changed
condition.
[10] ld.-Permanent AlimOD7-Kodi!cation of Allowance-BeCt
of Agreement of Partiea.-A reduction in the amount ot pay- :
menta for wife support would not violate a provision in an .
agreement between the parties that "Husband's obligation
to pa7 said alimony to Wife shan cease upon her death or
remarriage, except that in the ease of her .remarriage laid
payments shan be continued until five (6) y~re from [a
designated date], notwithstanding the fact that Wife may have
remarried within aaid period of time," linee such provision I
deals only with the termination of support payments, Dot with
their modi1leation.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County dismissing application for modification of a
judgment of divorce. Elmer D. Doyle, Judge. Reversed.
Fogel, McInerny & West, James E. West, Jr., and Steven
Edmondson for Appellant.

Hahn, RoIlS & Saunders and E. Lloyd Saunders for Respondent.
'l'RAYNOR, J.-On September 22, 1954, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement "to effect a final and
complete settlement of their respective property rights, support, alimony and custody of their child with reference to
their marital status and to each other." Paragraph eight of
the agreement obligates defendant to pay plaintiff $200 per
month "for the support, maintenance, education, care and
custody of said child until he shall reach the age of majority .
. . . " Paragraph nine provides that defendant shall pay
plaintiff an additional $200 per month "as alimony for her
support and maintenance.... " In paragraph twenty-three
each party releases the other from all present and future
claims and rights to support, separate maintenance; alimony,
court costs, attorneys' fees, and all property rights of any
kind except as provided for in the agreement. Other paragraphs deal with the division of marital property, the payment of debts, future education of the child, and termination
and modification 'of the support provisions.

)
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On November 1, 1954, an interlocutory decree of divorce
was entered in plaintiff's favor, approving the agreement and
ordering the performance of its terms. A final decree was
entered on November 10, 1955, incorporating the provisions
of the interlocutory decree. Plaintiff has since remarried.
On December 21, 1955, defendant filed an order to show
cause why the payments for support of plaintiff and the child
should not be reduced on the ground that his income had
materially decreased. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the order
to show cause on the grounds that the payments were ordered
pursuant to an integrated property settlement agreement and
could be reduced only in conformity with the provisions of
the agreement relating to modification and that these did not
encompass a decrease in defendant's income as a basis for
modification. After referring the matter to IL commissioner,
who found in plaintiff's favor, the court dismissed the order
to show cause. Defendant appeals, contending that the agreement is not integrated and that even if it is, IL material
reduction in his income is a ground for modification within
the express provisions of the agreement.
[1] When an order for support payments in a divorce
decree is based on an agreement of the parties, the possibility
of subsequent modification of the order without the consent
of both parties depends on the nature of the agreement.
Prior to Adams v. Adams, 29 Ca1.2d 621 [177 P.2d 265], the
cases attempted to classify all separation agreements either
as "property settlement" agreements or as "alimony" or
"support and maintenance" agreements. (Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 177-179 [44 P.2d 540]; Puckett v.
Puckett,21 Ca1.2d 833, 841-842 [136 P.2d 1] ; Hough v. Hough,
26 Ca1.2d 605, 614-615 [160 P.2d 15].) If the underlying
agreement was a "property settlement" agreement, the "support" order could not be modified without the consent of
the parties. (Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, supra, 3 Ca1.2d at 177178.) Conversely, if the ungerlying agreement was for "alimony" or "support and maintenance," the support order was
modifiable upon a showing of changed circumstances. (Hough
v. Hough, supra, 26 Cal.2d at 612.) In Adams v. Adams,
supra, 29 Ca1.2d at 624-625, and in Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.
2d 36, 41 [265 P.2d 873], we recognized that hybrid agreements to settle not only property rights but rights and duties
as to support are sui generis.
[2] The parties are free to limit their agreement to property rights. They may, for example, agree to a simple divi-
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sion. Or they may agree that one party is to receive the lio~~
share of the marital property and the other money payments,l
not in satisfaction of a statutory right to support, but solely\
to equalize the division of the marital property; suchan!
agreement is a true property settlement unconcerned 'witb1
rights and duties as to support. The court, therefore, may I
approve the agreement and in addition order the payment ol!
alimony (Adams v. Adams, supra, 29 Ca1.2d at 625), and 1lUcm,,1
an order is subject to modification on an adequate sbo'!'.iH'j
of changed circumstances. (Civ. Code, § 139.)
. : ~:~!."'."~
[3] The parties are likewise free to limit their agreem " .. ,
to their rights and duties as to support. They may,lW';l
example, agree that the wife will receive specified .moii.i~
payments in lieu of the statutory right to support. Such @j
agreement is a true "alimony" or "support and maintenance~
agreement, and under the rule of Hough v. Hough, IUprG,~~
Oa1.2d 605, 612, a support order based thereon is m . ..':Ii
on an adequate showing of changed circumstances.",
[4&] Frequently, however, the parties enter into a hybn':
agreement as in the Adams and Dexter cases and in Me886'Agir~
v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988]. The possibilitT~
of modifyiJ:g an order for support based on such an agr~~
ment without the consent of the parties, depends upon wheth~.l
the provisions for division of property and the. provisions f~A~
support are severable rather than integrated. If they ~:ii
integrated the order may not be modified unless the partiesJ
have provided for or agreed to such a modification. (Dexter ,./;~
Dexter, 8Upra, 42 Ca1.2d at 40.)
,'{~
[6] An agreement is integrated if the parties have agreed ,
that the provisions relating to division of property and the,'j
provisions relating to support constitute reciprocal consider~.;:;:
ation. The support provisions are then necessarily part and,~
'parcel of a division of property. Such an agreement would,~
be destroyed by subsequent modification of a support ord8f.~~
based thereon, without the consent of the parties. (Dexter
Dexter, 8Upra, 42 Cal.2d at 41.42; Messenger v. Messeng6f"'!
supra, 46 Cal.2d at 625, 627·628; Herda v. Herda, ant~;'i
pp. 228, 231-232 [308 P.2d 705].) It is immaterial whetb~i
or not the marital property is divided equally. (Dexter T.~
Dexter, 8Upra,42 Ca1.2d at 43; Messenger v. Messenger,IUpt'G,';
46 Oal.2d at 627-628.) It is immaterial that the amount ofj
the marital property is small. (Herda v. Herda, supra, (JfIt6J~
at p. 232.) It is likewise immaterial that the agreement:~
. calls for payments {or "support" or "alimony." (Messet&g-r,\~

,£i

ft

,I
~ii

)
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v. Messenger, supra, 46 Ca1.2d at 624-625 and cases there
cited.)
[4b] A support order based upon an integrated agreement
may be modified if the parties so provide. (Flynn v. Flynn,
42 Ca1.2d 55, 61 [265 P.2d 865].) Absent such a provision,
it cannot. [6] An agreement providing that the purpose of
the parties is to reach a final settlement of their rights and
duties with respect to both property and support, that they
intend each provision to be in consideration for each of the
other provisions, and that they waive all rights arising out
of the marital relationship except those expressly set out in
the agreement, will be deemed conclusive evidence that the
parties intended an integrated agreement. (Musenger v.
Messenger, supra, 46 Ca1.2d at 628; Anderson v. Mart, 47 Cal.
2d 274, 279 [303 P.2d 539] j Herda v. Herda, supra, ante,
at p. 232.) Even absent one or more of the foregoing provisions, there may be other proof that the parties intended an
integrated agreement. (Dexter v. Dexter, rupra, 42 Cal.2d
at 41.) [7] Thus, the parties may be uncertain as to the
value or legal ownership of property. They may be uncertain
which of them is entitled to a divorce and on what grounds
and therefore uncertain as to their legal rights with respect
to support and the division of property. An agreement for a
specified division of property and specified support payments
settling such uncertainties is integrated in the absence of convincing proof that the parties intended it to be severable.
(See Dexter v. Dexter, supra, 42 Ca1.2d at 48 j Musenger v.
Messenger, supra, 46 Ca1.2d at 627-628.)
[8] Under the foregoing rules the agreement in the present
case is clearly integrated. It deals both with rights to marital
property and rights to support. The parties have set forth
their purpose "to effect a final and complete settlement of
their ••. rights •.. with reference to their marital status
and to each other." They have released each other from all
claims arising out of the ~arital relationship except as provided in the agreement. The inference is clear that the
parties intended an integrated agreement. It is not necessary
that the parties expressly recite such an intent when the
agreement itself makes the intent clear. (Dexter v. Dexter,
supra, 42 Ca1.2d at 41.)
[4c] Our conclusion that the agreement is integrated, however, does not dispose of the case, for, as noted earlier, an
order for support b9S~d upon an integrated agreement may be
modified if the parties have expressly so provided. (Flynn.,.

)

)
I
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Flynn, S1tpra, 42 Ca1.2d at 61.) [9] Paragraph ten of the
agreement provides: ., For purposes of this agreement no earnings of Wife or other income obtained by her shall be considered as a 'changed condition' and taken into consideration in
connection with any attempt of Husband to obtain a reduction
in payment for support of Wife or said child, ... except such
portion of said earnings or other income as shall exceed the
gross average monthly sum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars.
. . . " Both parties concede that this part of the agreement
provides for modification of the court's support orders. Plainti1I contends, however, that the provision should be read as
recognizing only a single ground for modification, namely,
earnings or other income obtained by plainti1I in excess of
an average of $2!50 per month. The plain language of the
provision, however, indicates that the parties contemplated
modification upon an adequate showing of changed circumstances with a single limitation, that so long as plaintiff's
earnings or other income did not exceed the monthly average
of $250, any increase in her income would not be considered
a changed condition. We conclude, therefore, that upon a·
proper showing of a material reduction in defendant's income,
the trial court may in its judicial discretion modify its order
requiring payments for the support of plainti1I and the child.
[10] Plainti1I contends that a reduction in the amount of
the payments for her support would violate a provision found
in paragraph nine of the agreement, which reads: "Husband's
obligation to pay said alimony to Wife shall cease upon her
death or remarriage, except that in the case of her remarriage :
said payments shall be continued until five (5) years from
September 25, 1954, notwithstanding the fact that Wife may
have remarried within said period of time." This provision,
however, deals only with the termination of support payments,
not with their modification. It provides only that "payments"
shall continue, and a reduction in the amount of the payments
pursuant to paragraph ten will not violate its terms.
The order dismissing defendant's application for modifica- .
tion of the decree is reversed for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Gibson, C. I., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-1 ~ent.
The majority opinion is inconsistent in itself as weD as

)

)
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with prior decisions of this court. In the case at bar it is
held, by the majority, that the agreement under consideration
was an integrated property settlement agreement which could
not be modified unless the parties had agreed to a modification. Then it is held that despite the fact that the agreement
provided only one condition upon which the provisions could
be modified, that defendant was entitled to a modification
because his income had been reduced-a condition not mentioned in the agreement.
Paragraph 10 makes provision for the modification of the
agreement as follows: "For purposes of this agreement no
earnings of Wife or other incomt: obtained by her shall be
considered as a 'changed condition' and taken into consideration in connection with any attempt of Husband to obtain a
reduction in payment for support of Wife or said child, John
Daniel Plumer, except such portion or-said earnings or other
income as shall exceed the gross average monthly sum of Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00). 'Average Monthly' earnings or income shall be computed on the basis of the total
earnings or income of Wife (other than Husband's payments
to her) for the twelve months prior to the filing of Husband's
petition for reduction divided by twelve." The agreement is
completeJy silent as to any other provision or stipulation for
modification of the support payments to be made by the husband. A majority of this court adds its own provision for
modification to an admittedly integrated agreement and concludes "that upon a proper showing of a material reduction
in defendant's income, the trial court may in its judicial discretion modify its order requiring payments for the support
of plaintiff and the child." That the support and maintenance provisions of the agreement were intended as a division
of property is clearly shown by the provision in the agreement that the payments to the wife shall continue until her
remarriage but that notwithstanding her ,.ema,.riage the pay-

ments are to be continued "ntil five yea,.s f,.om Septembe,.
25,1954. In other words 'the parties intended that the wife
was to receive a certain sum of money whether or not she
remarried. A more complete expression of the parties' intention as to the division of their property is difficult to imagine.
The majority, sensing a need to gloss over its interference
with the parties' agreement, tells us that the provision whereby
plaintiff was to receive payments for five years from September 25, 1954;'was a provision dealing ., only with the
termination of 8llpport payments, not with their modi1ication.

)
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It provides only that 'payments' shall continuE', and a redue-\

tion in the amount of the payments pursuant to paragraph:
ten will not violate its terms. " The parties contemplated!
only one reason for modifying the payments and that was ifI
the plaintiff's separate income exceeded $250 exclusive ofl
the payments made to her by defendant. A majority of this!
court has expanded the parties' agreement to include another \
reason-a reduction in the defendant husband's income.
I am firmly of the opinion that, in the absence of consent I
by the parties, a court has no power to modify an agreement,
whether as to a division of their property or for the purpose of
support, entered into by the parties when there has been no I
fraud, overreaching or undue influence. Anything said by me t
to the contrary in the case of Hough v. Hough, 26 Oa1.2d 60511
[160 P.2d 15), is hereby expressly disapproved by me. In
subsequent cases I have made my views clearly known (see
concurring and dissenting opinions in Dexter v. Dexter, 42\
Oa1.2d 86, 44 [265 P.2d 878] ; Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 49, 581
[265 P.2d 881]; Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Oa1.2d 55, 62 [265 P.2d,
865] ; Anderson v. Mart, 47 CaUd 274, 284 [303 P.2d 589] ;!
Herda v. Herda, ante, pp. 228, 235 [808 P.2d 705); and
concurring opinion in Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Oa1.2d 619,
680 [297 P.2d 988]). I feel that since the code (Oiv. Code,
§§ 158, 159, 175) gives to the parties the right to contract with '
each other, their contract (in the absence of fraud or over-;
reaching) should be accorded the same dignity accorded:
.
other contracts.
In Dexter v. Dexter, rupra, 42 Ca1.2d 36, 42, a majority
of this court there held: ". . . the court cannot, after the
interlocutory decree has become final, add a provision for aUmony or modify the amount of payments ordered pursuant to
a property settlement agreement. Accordingly, if plaintiff
was satisfied with her contract whereby she had made
the support and maintenance provisions an integral part of the
settlement of property rights and had tenable grounds for
setting it aside, she should have attacked the agreement before
the interlocutory decree was entered. She cannot, however,
after having secured its approval by the court and having
accepted the benefits thereof, now seek relief inconsistent with
its terms." (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar the
majority admits that the agreement involved was an integrated
property settIementagreement. It is even admitted that a
property settlement' agreement containing support provisions
cannot be modified in the absence of a provision in the agree-

I
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ment providing for modification. Having paid lip service to
prior decisions, the majority then writes in its own provision
for modification. It is at once apparent that the majority
holding in the case at bar is directly contrary to what was
held and said in the Dexter case in the passage heretofore
quoted. In the case at bar, defendant husband accepted the
benefits of his bargain and now seeks to be relieved of the
burdens.
In Fox v. Fox, supra, 42 Cal.2d 49, 52, 53, a majority of
this court said: " . . . it is clear that the provisions for the
support and maintenance of plaintiff are an integral and inseverable part of the property settlement agreement of the
parties." And" Similarly, the fact that the payments might
be reduced under certain specified circumstances does not
indicate that they were alimony. Not only may the parties
include such provisions in agreements that are admittedly
solely property settlements (Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal.
625, 628 [206 P. 79]), but the provision in this case lends
support to the conclusion that at least part of the payments
constituted a division of property as such. Thus in no event
were the payments to fall below $200 per month, and they
were to cease on a fixed date without reference to plaintiff's
needs or defendant's abl1ity to pay after that time." (Emphasis added.) It should be recalled that in the case at bar
plaintiff was to receive a definite sum regardless of her needs
and regardless of defendant's ability to pay j and that the
payments were to continue until a certain date regardless of
plaintiff's remarriage. Only one specified condition W8.P
made for modification and that condition has not been met.
In Flynn v. Flynn, supra, 42 Cal.2d 55, 60, a majority of
this court held: "An examination of the property settlement incorporated by reference in the interlocutory decree
makes clear that it is an integrated bargain of the type considered in Dexter v. Dexter, ante, p. 36 [265 P.2d 873], and
Fox v. Fox, ante, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881]. Accordingly, the
provisions for monthly payments may not be modified contrary to its terms . ... Since the parties have provided that
the court may modify the payments ordered pursuant to the
terms of their agreement, the court has jurisdiction to do so in
accordance with the agreement." (Emphasis added.) It was
concluded that the defendant might "renew his motion for
a reduction in,the monthly payments in accordance with the
terms of the property settlement agreement any time the facts
.0 jtUfif1l."

l
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It appears to me tbat it sbould be obvious to lawyers and
laymen alike tbat tbe bolding in tbe case at bar is wholly
inc071sistent witb tbe bolding in tbe Flynn case.
In Messenger v. Messenger, supra, 46 Ca1.2d 619, 626, a majority of this court beld tbat " . . . the parties bave made tbe
provision for support an integral part of tbeir property settlement agreement." Tbat "Plaintiff was entitled to agree ...
to an equal division of tbe community property in exchange
for support and maintenance payments tbat could not be
reduced." And that "Witb such conclusive evidence of
integration, the provisions for support and maintenance or
alimony would be subject to modification only if the parties
expressly so provided. (See Flynn v. Flynn, supra, 42 Cal.
2d 55, 61, and cases cited.) The court may not, however,
'insert what has been omitted' (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858) and
thereby abrogate the clearly expressed agreement of the
parties." (Empbasis added.) In tbe case at bar this court
has I t inserted what has been omitted" and has, thereby,
abrogated the" clearly expressed agreement of the parties"!
So, again, the majority opinion is clearly inconsistent with
its opinion in the Messenger case.
In Anderson v. Mart, supra, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 279, a majority
of this court, quoting from the Messenger case, held that
the conclusion was inescapable that the parties had made
the provision for the wife's support an integral part of the
property settlement agreement. It was held that since the
property settlement agreement made no provision for termination of the support payments to the wife and since the
parties had not, in accordance with their agreement entered
into a written modification of its terms, that the wife was
entitled to recover from the husband's estate the present value
of the amount attributable to her support for the remainder
of her life expectancy. Tbe majority held, again quoting
from the Messenger case, that ". . . the provisions for support and maintenance or alimony would be subject to modification only if the parties expressly so provided." The court
refused to consider defendant's theory that the support provisions were intended by the parties to end with the death of
the payor and held that since there had been no written
modification as provided for in the agreement the payments
did not terminate. In the case at bar, no provision was made
for modification of the wife's support payments in the event
of a decrease in the husband's income but the majority of
this court has geiterously supplied that omission and has
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abrogated the parties' clearly expressed agreement. (See
Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 619, 626 [297 P.2d 988J.)
As I pointed out in my dissenting opinion in Herda v.
Herda, supra, ante, pp. 228, 235, the majority reached an
entirely different result on similar facts than was reached in
the Anderson case. Here again it was held by the majority
that the support payments were an integral and inseparable
part of the property settlement agreement entered into between the parties. But even though no termination date was
expressed in the agreement and even though no mention was
made concerning the termination of the payments on the
wife's remarriage or the death of the husband, a majority of
this court held that "Since the agreement in the present
case dealt primarily with support rights and the payments
were described as for support and maintenance, it would be
unreasonable to conclude that the agreement contemplated
that the payments should continue for plaintiff'. [wife's]
benefit after the obligation to support the children had terminated.•.. " (Emphasis added.) In both the Herda and
Anderson cases where different results were reached the majority relies upon the Messenger case. Because there was no
provision for the support payments to cease upon the husband's death, the majority in the Anderson case held that
plaintiff was entitled to recover from the husband's estate
for the balance of her life expectancy; in the Herda case,
even though there was no provision for the wife's support
payments to cease on her remarriage, the majority held that
"it would be unreasonable to conclude" that the parties had
not intended such payments to cease when the wife remarried.
As long as a majority of this court continues to rewrite
the parties' agreements for them, add provisions which are
not present, constitute itself the trier of fact and, in general,
refuses to permit property -settlement agreements to be enforced according to the rules applicable to other contracts,
this state of ultimate confusion will exist in this field of the
law in California. It is unfortunate that this court is the
court of last resort in this field and that there is no higher
authority to lay down a workable rule of law so that attorneys
can, with some measure of certainty, advise their clients.
I would affirm the order dismissing defendant '8 application
for modification of the decree.
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